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Abstract: Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the 
business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. In this paper, we set out to 
empirically test this picture of philosophy as “armchair philosophy.” If philosophy were indeed a 
priori, and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair, then we would 
expect to see that reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers 
to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments, which are the sort of arguments 
whose premises, if true, necessitate the truth of their conclusions. Our results show that the 
percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than the percentage of 
articles advancing inductive arguments, which is what we would expect from the vantage point 
of the “armchair philosophy” picture. However, our results also show that the percentages of 
articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging 
over time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. 
This trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant 
form of argumentation in philosophy. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Restall (2009, p. 37), “Philosophers love a priori knowledge: we delight in truths 
that can be known from the comfort of our armchairs, without the need to venture out in the 
world for confirmation.” Many philosophers think that this is what philosophy is; that is, that 
“philosophy is a priori” (Williamson 2007, p. 1). According to this conception of philosophy, the 
“traditional methods of philosophy are armchair ones [hence, “armchair philosophy”]: they 
consist of thinking, without any special interaction with the world beyond the chair, such as 
measurement, observation or experiment would typically involve” (Williamson 2007, p. 1). In 
other words, philosophical inquiry “seeks to arrive at conceptually grounded necessary truths 
that are general in scope” (Henderson and Horgan 2013, p. 115).1 Some go so far as to claim that 
philosophy not only is but also “should be regarded as [...] a priori” (Deutsch 2015, p. xx). Those 
who subscribe to this picture of philosophy as “armchair philosophy” draw a sharp distinction 
between philosophical methodology and the methodologies of the sciences (see, e.g., Bealer 
1998, pp. 201-240). And some are even critical of empirical methodologies, such as 
experimental philosophy, and the like (see, e.g., Williamson 2016, pp. 22-36).2 
In this paper, we set out to empirically test this picture of philosophy as “armchair 
philosophy” against actual philosophical practice.3 If philosophy is indeed a priori, where “a 
priori” means “derived from mere thinking, independent of sense experience,” to be 
                                               
1 See also Melnyk (2008, p. 267) on conceptual analysis as “a priori discovery of necessary truths” from the 
armchair. 
2 See also the essays collected in Horvath and Grundmann (2012). 
3 Of course, there are different conceptions of what philosophy is or what its aim is. For a recent discussion, see 
Kriegel (2016). 
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distinguished from “a posteriori,” i.e., “derived from sense experience” (Gutting 2009, p. 11), 
and it is in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair, then we would expect 
to see that reflected in philosophical practice. 
In the next section, we describe how we think the “armchair philosophy” picture, if it 
were an accurate picture of what philosophy is, would be reflected in philosophical practice. 
Then, in Section 3, we will report the results of our experimental study and discuss their 
implications in Section 4. 
 
2. Methods 
Most logic textbooks instruct students to look for indicator words when trying to identify 
arguments in context. For example, according to Copi et al. (2011, p. 11): 
One useful method [for recognizing arguments] depends on the appearance of certain 
common indicators, certain words or phrases that typically serve to signal the appearance 
of an argument’s conclusion or of its premises.4 
Copi et al. (2011, pp. 11-12) go on to provide the following list of conclusion indicator words 
and premise indicator words (Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 See also Salmon (2013), p. 15. 
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Table 1. A list of conclusion indicators and premise indicators 
Conclusion indicators Premise indicators 
therefore since 
hence because 
so for 
accordingly follows from 
consequently as shown by 
proves that the reason is that 
thus may be derived from 
it follows that may be deduced from 
we may infer in view of the fact that 
 
For instance, Moore’s use of the phrase ‘prove that’ in the following passage signals to 
the reader what the conclusion of the argument that Moore puts forth is (emphasis added): 
I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two 
hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and 
adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing 
this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can 
also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples (Moore 
1959, pp. 145-146). 
The conclusion of Moore’s anti-skeptical argument, then, is that there is an external world, i.e., 
there are things that exist outside the mind, such as hands, papers, shoes, etc., as indicated by his 
use of the indicator word ‘prove’. 
Indicator words are also supposed to help students distinguish between deductive 
arguments and inductive arguments. For example, according to Baronett (2016, p. 23): 
To help identify arguments as either deductive or inductive, one thing we can do is look 
for key words or phrases. For example, the words “necessarily,” “certainly,” “definitely,” 
and “absolutely” suggest a deductive argument. [...] On the other hand, the words 
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“probably,” “likely,” “unlikely,” “improbable,” “plausible,” and “implausible” suggest 
inductive arguments. 
Similarly, according to Hurley (2016, p. 31), “inductive indicators” include terms and phrases 
such as “probably,” “improbable,” “plausible,” “implausible,” “likely,” “unlikely,” and 
“reasonable to conclude,” whereas “deductive indicators” include terms and phrases such as “it 
necessarily follows that,” “certainly,” “absolutely,” and “definitely.” 
 
Table 2. A list of deductive and inductive indicator words 
Deductive indicators Inductive indicators 
necessarily (im)probably 
certainly (un)likely 
definitely (im)plausible 
absolutely (un)reasonable 
 
For example, the presence of the conclusion indicator ‘so’ and the inductive indicator ‘plausible’ 
in the following passage suggests that the argument is supposed to be inductive (emphasis 
added): 
It would be a miracle, a coincidence on a near cosmic scale, if a theory made as many 
correct empirical predictions as, say, the general theory of relativity or the photon theory 
of light without what that theory says about the fundamental structure of the universe 
being correct or “essentially” or “basically” correct. But we shouldn’t accept miracles, 
not at any rate if there is a non-miraculous alternative. If what these theories say is going 
on “behind” the phenomena is indeed true or “approximately true” then it is no wonder 
that they get the phenomena right. So it is plausible to conclude that presently accepted 
theories are indeed “essentially” correct (Worrall 1989, p. 101). 
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Indeed, this argument, which is known as the “no-miracles argument” for scientific realism, is 
commonly taken by philosophers of science to be an inference to the best explanation (Sankey 
2016, pp. 22-23). Of course, whether the no-miracles argument is strong or cogent is another 
matter (see, e.g., Mizrahi 2012).5 
Likewise, the presence of the premise indicator ‘since’ and the deductive indicator 
‘necessarily’ in the following passage suggests that the argument is supposed to be deductive 
(emphasis added): 
if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of 
happiness or a means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, 
that these are the only things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole end of human action, 
and the promotion of it is the test by which to judge all human conduct; from whence it 
necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the 
whole (Mill 1871, p. 58). 
Again, whether Mill’s proof is valid or sound is another matter (see, e.g., Atkinson 1957). 
Accordingly, if philosophy is indeed a priori, and in the business of discovering 
necessary truths from the armchair, then the sort of arguments we would expect philosophers to 
make are deductive arguments, namely, the sort of arguments whose premises, if true, “provide 
conclusive support for their conclusions,” “necessitate the truth of the conclusion,” and “are 
indefeasible” (Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, p. 251; emphasis added). This means that 
we would expect philosophers to frame their arguments using mostly deductive indicators, such 
as ‘necessarily’, ‘certainly’, and ‘conclusively’, rather than inductive indicators, such as 
                                               
5 In our experimental study, we do not distinguish between inductive arguments and abductive arguments (or 
inferences to the best explanation). Insofar as they are the sort of arguments whose premises, if true, make the 
conclusion more likely to be true or probable, rather than necessitate or guarantee its truth, abductive arguments can 
be considered a type of inductive arguments. It would be interesting, however, to use our empirical methodology to 
study how abductive arguments are used in philosophical practice. We leave this question for another occasion. 
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‘probably’, ‘plausibly’, and ‘likely’. If we find that philosophers frame their arguments using 
mostly inductive indicators, then that would suggest that philosophers advance mostly inductive, 
not deductive, arguments. But this would be contrary to what we would expect if philosophy 
were a priori, and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. Since, 
unlike deductive arguments, which are the sort of arguments whose premises (if true) necessitate 
the truth of their conclusions, inductive arguments are the sort of arguments whose premises (if 
true) make their conclusions probably (or more likely to be true). In other words, deductive 
inference is monotonic, whereas inductive inference is ampliative and non-monotonic (Levi 
2005, pp. 177-192). 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that, according to the “armchair philosophy” picture, 
all philosophical arguments must be deductive arguments. As Gutting (2009, p. 11) points out: 
The days are long gone when adequate philosophical argument had to be valid deduction 
from self-evident premises. We allow that a good philosophical argument may be 
inductive or based on premises expressing widely shared common-sense judgments. 
However, if the “armchair philosophy” picture of philosophical methodology is accurate, i.e., if 
philosophy is indeed a priori, and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the 
armchair, then we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, not inductive, 
arguments. In addition, both inductive arguments and deductive arguments may work together. 
For example, inductive arguments may be given as the evidence for the premises of a deductive 
argument. But such reliance on induction, even in support of premises, would still not be in 
accordance with the “armchair philosophy” picture painted above. 
It is also important to note that indicator words are not a foolproof method for detecting 
arguments in context. As they instruct students to look for indicator words when trying to 
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identify arguments in context, most logic textbooks are also careful to point out that the presence 
or absence of indicator words does not guarantee the presence or absence of an argument. For 
instance, according to Hurley (2016, p. 15), “the mere occurrence of an indicator word by no 
means guarantees the presence of an argument.” Likewise, the mere absence of an indicator word 
does not guarantee the absence of an argument. Nevertheless, indicator words are still pretty 
good indicators of the presence and/or absence of arguments, which is why logic textbooks 
instruct students to look for them. Furthermore, since the arguments we have looked at for the 
purposes of our empirical study are arguments made by professional philosophers, we can be 
pretty confident that professional philosophers, who are trained in logic and argumentation, 
seldom misuse indicator words in an effort to dress up arguments artificially. 
In order to get an idea of how many philosophy articles employ deductive and inductive 
arguments, we searched the JSTOR database using the deductive and inductive indicator words 
outlined in Table 2. We wanted to ensure that the indicators were actually attached to an 
argument, though, so we combined argument indicators from Table 1 with deductive indicators 
from Table 2, as well as argument indicators from Table 1 with inductive indicators from Table 
2, to create indicator pairs. The argument indicators were distributed resulting in 32 deductive 
indicator pairs and 32 inductive indicator pairs. 
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Table 3. A list of deductive and inductive indicator pairs. 
Deductive pairs Inductive pairs 
therefore necessarily therefore probably 
therefore certainly therefore likely 
therefore definitely therefore unlikely 
therefore absolutely therefore improbable 
hence necessarily hence probably 
hence certainly hence likely 
hence definitely hence unlikely 
hence absolutely hence improbable 
so necessarily so probably 
so certainly so likely 
so definitely so unlikely 
so absolutely so improbable 
accordingly necessarily accordingly probably 
accordingly certainly accordingly likely 
accordingly definitely accordingly unlikely 
accordingly absolutely accordingly improbable 
consequently necessarily consequently probably 
consequently certainly consequently likely 
consequently definitely consequently unlikely 
consequently absolutely consequently improbable 
proves necessarily proves probably 
proves certainly proves likely 
proves definitely proves unlikely 
proves absolutely proves improbable 
thus necessarily thus probably 
thus certainly thus likely 
thus definitely thus unlikely 
thus absolutely thus improbable 
follows necessarily follows probably 
follows certainly follows likely 
follows definitely follows unlikely 
follows absolutely follows improbable 
 
We searched simultaneously for any match of the 32 indicator pairs where the indicator terms 
were within 3 words of each other. In addition to the original 3-word search, we also conducted 
searches allowing 6 and 10 words between indicator words. Some examples of the search results 
are listed here (emphasis added): 
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1. “The method for creating better theory and better practice (always at the heart of the 
pragmatists’ vision) is therefore necessarily collaborative, with action tested by many in 
a variety of circumstances” (Ronald and Roskelly 2001, p. 619). 
2. “Thus there certainly seems to be categories whose basic members are verbs that 
combine with an adverb somewhere along the route to becoming heads of complete 
VP’s” (McConnell-Ginet 1982, p. 165). 
3. “Hence, it is very likely that folk concepts of the pragmatic dimension of intentional talk 
are more richly understood than the core notions of the cognitive machinery that 
underlies intentional action” (Adams and Steadman 2004, p. 174). 
4. “It therefore seems unlikely that the difference between people’s responses to the harm 
vignette and their responses to the help vignette is due entirely to pragmatic factors” 
(Knobe 2004, p. 184). 
By choosing this search methodology, the searches return articles with one or more of the 
indicator pairs. One of the limitations of the JSTOR Data for Research corpus 
(http://dfr.jstor.org/) is that we are unable to identify how many times each indicator pair shows 
up. As such, the results returned by the searches can only show the prevalence of articles 
containing each type of argument, rather than the prevalence of each type of argument within 
articles. To get a better idea of prevalence relative to the number of articles within the JSTOR 
corpus, we focused on the ratio of search results to total philosophy articles within the corpus 
and the percentage of matching articles in the database. We chose to look at the years 1840 to 
2012 because early years often have so few articles that results are not reliable. 
 
3. Results 
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In searches allowing 3 words between indicator terms, the overall percentage of matches is low, 
with an average ratio of 3.67% for deductive indicators and 1.81% for inductive indicators. In 
addition, the ratio of articles advancing deductive arguments is almost always higher than those 
advancing inductive arguments (see Figure 1). The ratios are converging over time, with more 
recent years seeing small differences between inductive and deductive ratios. To test this, we 
looked at a linear model of the differences. The equation for the line was y = -0.0003x + 0.0463. 
Because the slope of the line is negative, we can say the overall trend is that the difference 
between inductive and deductive ratios is in fact decreasing over time. 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of philosophy articles in the JSTOR corpus with inductive or deductive 
indicators within 3 words of each other. 
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As we would expect, searches allowing 6 words between the indicator words resulted in 
higher overall ratios (see Figure 2). In this case, the average percentage of articles advancing 
inductive arguments is 2.59% and the average deductive ratio is 5.67%. Consistent with the less 
permissive search, we see that the difference in ratios is still declining over time. We again 
developed a linear model of the ratio differences over time with the linear equation y = -0.0003x 
+ 0.0591. The negative slope again indicates that the percentage of articles advancing inductive 
arguments is converging with the percentage of articles advancing deductive arguments. The 
overall decrease in difference is consistent with the results from the less permissive search. 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of philosophy articles in the JSTOR corpus with inductive or deductive 
indicators within 6 words of each other. 
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The most permissive search we performed allowed for up to 10 words between the 
indicator words. This search returned similar trends as the less permissive searches while 
increasing the overall percentage of matching articles (see Figure 3). The average percentage of 
articles advancing inductive arguments is 3.81% and the average percentage of articles 
advancing deductive ones is 8.13%. Again, we modelled the difference in these percentages over 
time. The result is another linear model, this time with the equation y = -0.0004x + 0.0762, 
indicating that the two ratios are converging over time with the smallest differences being the 
most recent. 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of philosophy articles in the JSTOR corpus with inductive or deductive 
indicators within 10 words of each other. 
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Our last set of tests involved rigorously comparing the inductive ratios to the deductive 
ratios over time. As evidenced above, the deductive ratios tend to be higher but we also tested 
this hypothesis using paired t-tests. For the least permissive search (maximum 3 words between 
indicators), the percentage of articles advancing deductive arguments is statistically higher than 
the percentage of articles advancing inductive arguments, t(172) = -8.90 and one-sided p = 3.69 
x 10-16. These results are consistent for searches allowing 6 words between indicators, t(172) = -
13.57 and one-sided p = 2.79 x 10-29, and searches allowing 10 words between indicators, t(172) 
= -15.77 and one-sided p = 1.53 x 10-35. Overall, this indicates that the percentage of articles 
advancing deductive arguments is higher than the percentage of articles advancing inductive 
arguments. 
 
4. Discussion 
To sum up, our key findings are the following: 
1. The ratio, and likewise percentage, of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments 
is higher than the percentage of articles advancing inductive arguments. 
2. The ratios and percentages of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments and 
those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time. 
3. The difference between inductive and deductive ratios, and their percentages, is declining 
over time. 
On the “armchair philosophy” picture of philosophical methodology, finding 1 is to be expected. 
As we mentioned in Section 2, if philosophy is indeed a priori, and in the business of discovering 
necessary truths from the armchair, then we would expect philosophers to frame their arguments 
using mostly deductive indicators, such as ‘necessarily’, ‘certainly’, and ‘conclusively’, rather 
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than inductive indicators, such as ‘probably’, ‘plausibly’, and ‘likely’. This is because, unlike 
inductive arguments, deductive arguments are the sort of arguments whose premises, if true, 
“provide conclusive support for their conclusions,” “necessitate the truth of the conclusion,” and 
“are indefeasible” (Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, p. 251; emphasis added). 
However, findings 2 and 3 are not quite what we would expect if philosophy is a priori, 
and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. It is not the fact that 
philosophy articles sometimes advance inductive arguments that is unexpected on the “armchair 
philosophy” picture. As we mentioned in Section 2, inductive arguments are now “allowed” in 
philosophy (Gutting 2009, p. 11). Rather, what is unexpected, from the vantage point of the 
“armchair philosophy” picture, is that the ratios and percentages of articles advancing deductive 
arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time. In other words, 
the results of our experimental study reveal a trend in philosophical methodology. The trend is 
that the difference between the ratios of articles advancing deductive arguments and those 
advancing inductive arguments is decreasing over time. To put it another way, it looks like 
deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in 
philosophy. 
These findings, namely, 2 and 3, are not quite consistent with those of Knobe (2015). 
Knobe (2015) compared two samples of papers in philosophy of mind, one from 1960 to 1999 
and another from 2009 to 2013, and found that the percentage of papers using purely a priori 
methods declined from 62% in the 1960-1999 sample to 12% in the 2009-2013 sample. On the 
other hand, our data show that, overall, the ratio of philosophy articles advancing deductive 
arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, although the difference between 
the ratios of articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments is 
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decreasing over time. In that respect, it is important to note that our sample is much larger than 
Knobe’s samples, for our searches are not restricted to philosophy of mind and include, not only 
the most highly cited papers in Google Scholar Metrics and Web of Science, but all philosophy 
articles in the JSTOR corpus from 1840 to 2012. For these reasons, Knobe’s (2015) data do not 
warrant any conclusions about trends in philosophical methodology, whereas our data support 
our claim that the overall trend is that the difference between the ratios of articles advancing 
deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments is decreasing over time. 
Of course, our data do not tell us what might be the cause (or causes) of this trend. So we 
can only speculate that the cause might have something to do with the increasing popularity of 
empirical methods in philosophy, such as experimental philosophy, and the like. That is why we 
think that further studies are needed in order to understand the trend in philosophical 
methodology that our experimental study has uncovered. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we set out to empirically test the “armchair philosophy” picture of philosophical 
methodology, according to which philosophy is a priori, and in the business of discovering 
necessary truths from the armchair. We would expect the “armchair philosophy” picture to be 
reflected in philosophical practice in terms of the sort of arguments philosophers advance. In 
particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, 
arguments, which are the sort of arguments whose premises, if true, necessitate the truth of their 
conclusions. 
The results of our experimental study show that the percentage of philosophy articles 
advancing deductive arguments is higher than the percentage of articles advancing inductive 
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arguments, which is what we would expect from the vantage point of the “armchair philosophy” 
picture. However, contrary to what we would expect to see reflected in philosophical practice if 
the “armchair philosophy” picture is accurate, our results show that the percentages of articles 
advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over 
time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. This 
trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of 
argumentation in philosophy. We propose that further studies are needed to understand the cause 
(or causes) of this trend. 
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